Do young children form "referential pacts"? If a person has referred to an object with a certain term (e.g., the horse), will children expect this person to use this term in the future but allow others to use a different expression (e.g., the pony)? One hundred twenty-eight children between 3 and 5 years old co-operated with an experimenter (E1) to move toys to new locations on a shelf. E1 established referential terms for all toys in a warm-up game. Then, either the original partner, E1, or a new partner, E2, played a second game with the same toys. In this game, the experimenters referred to toys using either their original terms from the warm-up game or new terms. Children were slower to react to new terms than old, and this difference in reaction times was greater in the original partner condition (but only on the first trial).
According to Grice's (1975) maxim of manner, speakers should avoid obscurity of expression. They should not, therefore, refer to the same object with different terms without good reason (E. V. Clark, 1987) . So, if you and I are engaged in moving some toys around on a set of shelves, and I consistently refer to a toy as the bush, then you will come to expect me to continue to use that term to refer to the same object in the future. If I suddenly abandon the "referential pact" and call the toy the tree, then you will be momentarily confused. However, if a new person (with no prior experience of our pact) enters the room and uses the alternative referring expression (the tree), you would not find it confusing, as long as the expression is an acceptable description of the toy in the absence of a prior pact (cf. Barr & Keysar, 2002; Brennan & Clark, 1996; Brennan & Hanna, 2009; H. H. Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986; Garrod & Anderson, 1987; Kronmüller & Barr, 2007; Metzing & Brennan, 2003; Shintel & Keysar, 2007 .
In an experimental investigation of adult sensitivity to referential pacts, Metzing and Brennan (2003) had participants play a cooperative game of the type that we described previously with an experimenter who established shared terms for objects (e.g., the shiny cylinder) during repeated references to them. After this warm-up phase, either the original experimenter or a new experimenter (who had not observed the warm up) continued the game and used either the original expressions or new ones (e.g., the silver pipe) to refer to the previously discussed objects. In this test phase, when interacting with the original partner, adults were significantly (700 ms) slower to react to new expressions than to old expressions. No such difference in reaction times was observed when adults interacted with a new partner. This partner-specific difference in reaction times was argued to reflect adult sensitivity to referential pacts-If someone suddenly switches from using one term to using another for no apparent reason, it slows down one's reactions.
In the adult language processing literature, there is some debate as to the nature of the effect reported by Metzing and Brennan (2003) , with a variety of alternative accounts being proposed. The first account is that a pact is an agreement made between two people to take a given perspective on an object, where this agreement is believed by both interlocutors to be mutual and its maintenance is understood to be cooperative (e.g., Brennan & Clark, 1996) . The second, not necessarily incompatible with the first, is a more cue-based explanation, whereby people remember the context in which terms are uttered and part of their memory includes information about who has used which terms in the past with reference to which objects. When an individual is talking about the same objects with the same people in the future, the previously used terms become highly cued and effectively preempt the use of other terms. When the individual is talking about the same objects with different people in the future, no term is especially cued and the comprehension of new expressions is easier as they have not been preempted by an alternative (Metzing & Brennan, 2003; Shintel & Keysar, 2007 . A third account proposes that previously used terms are likely to be cued (and to preempt others) no matter whom an individual is talking to in the future, and only after an initial attempt to comprehend expressions without reference to the specific referential history of the person producing the term will the individual come to take partner-specific information into account (Kronmüller & Bar, 2006) .
It is difficult to decide which of these accounts is most accurate because several contextual factors affect the observation of referential pacts, and these are currently not fully understood. For example, it is not currently clear whether partner-specific effects act as soon as an individual begins processing an expression or only when the individual is trying to recover from comprehension difficulties caused by hearing an unexpected term. Such differences in timing of the effect vary as a function of the precise details of the experimental set-up, stimulus items, and cognitive load placed on the participants (Brown-Schmidt, 2009; Kronmü ller & Barr, 2007) . There is also controversy concerning whether referential pacts rest on a principle of cooperativeness that is mutually assumed to hold between two conversational partners or whether pacts are a reflection of a more simple expectation that people will be consistent in their use of expressions across time. This latter possibility has been supported in experiments in which a participant surreptitiously observes a future partner playing the first round of a game with someone else and then comes to expect that partner (with whom no implicit agreements about reference could hold) to use the same terms when that partner later plays the game with the participant (Shintel & Keysar, 2007 .
Developmental data have the potential to contribute to these debates. Since, in some accounts, sensitivity to referential pacts requires the calculation of complex inferences based on other people's knowledge (or lack thereof) of a prior conversation, children might not be expected to react similarly to adults in the situations described previously. Thus, it is plausible that children younger than 4 years would expect everyone to use the same term for an object, regardless of whether they were present when a pact was established. Indeed, studies in which the alternative naming paradigm has been used suggest that 3-year-olds do not realize that what one person might correctly call and think of as a rabbit, another person might correctly call and think of as a bunny (Doherty, 2000; Doherty & Perner, 1998; Perner, Rendl, & Garnham, 2007; Perner, Stummer, Sprung, & Doherty, 2002) . In the judgment version of this task, children have to name a toy (e.g., bunny), and then when the puppet refers to the toy by an alternative term (rabbit), the children must decide whether the puppet's term is acceptable or not. Three-year-olds tend to fail the alternative name task (insisting that a bunny cannot also be called a rabbit or an animal), whereas older children tend to pass at around the same age that they begin to pass traditional false belief tasks.
In contrast to the findings of the alternative naming studies, findings of a number of other studies indicate that even young children are relatively flexible in the referring expressions they will accept for an object (e.g., E. V. Clark, 1997; E. V. Clark & Svaib, 1997; Deák & Maratsos, 1998; Liittschwager & Markman, 1994; Mervis, Golinkoff, & Bertrand, 1994) . Such studies suggest that at least in pragmatically well-motivated circumstances, children younger than 4 years might have no problem accepting that two different terms may apply to a referent equally felicitously.
Of course, even if children appreciate that several terms can apply to a referent, they may still be oblivious to the partnerspecific nature of referential pacts. Since young children are well known to have difficulty taking into account other people's knowledge states when predicting their actions (for example, in traditional false belief tasks; see Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001 , for a review), one might expect that 3-year-olds would not be sensitive to the fact that only people who have had prior experience of a referential pact could be expected to reliably adhere to it. Thus, 3-year-olds might be confused by the use of new terms regardless of the identity and prior experience of their interlocutor. If this is the case and children show sensitivity to referential pacts only after they reach 4 years of age, one could infer that processing such pacts requires social cognitive skill beyond the reach of 3-year-olds. This would support psycholinguistic accounts that propose that pacts are explicitly represented as a mutually held belief that individuals have agreed to refer to object x as y. If, on the other hand, 3-year-olds do show sensitivity to referential pacts, one must conclude either that children have more sophisticated social-cognitive skills than previously thought or conversely that referential pacts rely on social-cognitive and pragmatic abilities already known to be developed early in childhood.
With these possibilities in mind, we were interested in establishing whether young children are sensitive to referential pacts and whether this sensitivity emerges before or after 4 years of age. We thus adapted Metzing & Brennan's (2003) task for use with 3-and 5-year-old children. In a within-subjects design, children played with two sets of toys. With one set, Experimenter 1 (E1) established names for the toys in a warm-up phase (e.g., saying "Pick up the car. OK, move it next to the man. Great, now pick up the horse.") and then continued to play in the test phase. With the other set of toys, E1 played the warm-up phase, and then a new person, E2, played the test phase. Both test phases had four critical toys: Toys 1 and 3 were referred to with an original expression established in the warm-up phase (e.g., car) and Toys 2 and 4 were referred to with an entirely new expression (e.g., pony). We recorded how long it took children to pick up each toy upon the experimenter's instructions. Thus, for each test phase, we were able to make two comparisons: whether children were quicker to pick up Toy 1 than Toy 2 (Trial 1) and whether they were quicker to pick up Toy 3 than Toy 4 (Trial 2). Of greatest interest was whether any differences in reaction times vary as a function of the identity of the experimenter. If children are sensitive to partner-specific referential pacts, then they would be expected to be confused when E1 used one term in the warm-up phase and a new term in the test phase. No such confusion would arise when E2 used a new term in the test phase.
Method Participants
One hundred and twenty-six normally developing, monolingual, English-speaking children were included in the study (51 boys, 75 girls). The age range for the 3-year-old group (n ϭ 62) was from 3 years 0 months to 3 years 11 months (M age, 3 years 5 months), and the age range for the 5-year-old group (n ϭ 64) was from 5 years 0 months to 5 years 11 months (M age, 5 years 6 months). An additional 29 children (21 in the 3-year-old group and eight in 5-year-old group) were not included because either (a) the child did not complete the task, (a) the child named one of the key test items during the warm up with a term not used by the experimenter, (c) the child had missing data points for more than two test items (because of distraction), (d) a parent named one of the test items (despite being instructed not to do so), or (e) experimenter error. The children were tested at the Max Planck Child Study Centre at the University of Manchester. Children were recruited from a database of volunteers that had been built though advertising and by mailing invitations to families across the city at addresses supplied by a marketing company. Full parental consent was obtained for each child. Approximately 95% of the children were White European. Parents were not required to inform us of their socioeconomic status or educational background. However, most children were middle class, and all 5-year-olds attended school full time.
Materials
Fourteen toys were selected on the basis that they could be described felicitously by two different, well-known nouns that occur frequently in the speech directed to 3-year-old children (as verified by a search of the Child Language Data Exchange System [CHILDES] database, MacWhinney, 2000). Of these 14, eight were selected as stimuli on the basis that a group of 3-year-olds (n ϭ 16, not tested in any of the subsequent procedures) used at least two different well-known words spontaneously to refer to the toys when asked "What's this?" These preferred terms were then used as the referring expressions for the study. The pairs of terms used to describe the eight critical toys are presented in Table 1 . One set of toys was used for the same partner condition and another set for the new partner condition (counterbalanced).
To be confident that most 3-year-olds would be able to identify each toy upon hearing either of the terms, we first conducted a comprehension test with two groups each made up of seven 2-year-olds and twelve 3-year-olds. Again, none of these children took part in the main study. Both groups saw all the toys at the same time and were asked to "find the [toy name]." The first group heard the first of the alternative terms (car, nose, book, and so on), and the second group heard the second of the terms (bush, cushion, nose, and so on ). In all cases, at least five 2-year-olds and eleven 3-year-olds were able to identify each toy on the basis of the terms they heard.
For each partner condition in the main study, we put one set of test toys along with eight "filler" toys into a 5 ϫ 3 block of Perspex (ICI Chemicals and Polymers, Middlesborough, England) pigeonholes (see Figure 1) . The arrangement of the toys was fixed such that an experimenter could follow a script to instruct the child to rearrange the toys. Photographs of each set of toys in differing arrangements were taken and used as props (as will be discussed later). Figure 1 presents example arrangements for both of the sets of toys. A video camera was set up at the edge of the Perspex boxes such that it was possible for us to code precisely at which frame the child's hand entered a box to retrieve a toy (see Figure 2) . Two other video cameras recorded the child and the experimenter as they interacted.
Procedure
Upon arrival, the child and their caregiver(s) entered the test room, and the child was allowed to play freely with E1 while E2 obtained parental consent for the study. This ensured the child had seen both experimenters before the test began. After the child had a period of free play, E2 left the room, and the child sat with E1 at a table in front of the Perspex boxes, which were covered with a piece of cloth to prevent the child from spontaneously naming the objects. E1 explained that under the cover, there were lots of toys and that she had a photo of where the toys should go. E1 showed the child the first photograph briefly at this point. She then suggested that she could look at the picture to see what needed to be moved around and that the child could find the toys and put them in the right places. She asked the child if he or she would like to help, and when the child agreed, E1 said that they would manage to do it together. E1 then lifted the cover to reveal the toys for the first game.
Each child played four games, two per condition. Each game consisted of rearranging the toys so that they matched the arrangement in a photograph. The first game of each condition served as a warm up during which the children were introduced to and entrained on all the key referring expressions. This first game was always played with E1. It consisted of a sequence of 16 instructions in the basic form "Get the x. OK, now put it next to/under/ above the y." Hesitations and hedges (e.g., "Now, get . . . I think it's a Lego . . . . Can you see any? Yes, put it under the . . .er . . . man" ) were written into the script to reinforce the impression that the experimenter did not have a fixed conceptualization of all of the toys from the outset. The experimenter referred to each of the four critical test objects four times using the same (original) expression used during the warm up.
For accuracy of reaction time coding, we had to ensure that the children's hands were always in the same position on the table before they took an object out of a box. To achieve this, after 12 warm-up instructions, E1 showed each child a pair of red hands that had been stuck on the table and asked the child to put his or her hands on the red hands to show that he or she was ready before each turn. From this point on, E1 ensured that the child returned his or her hands to the red hands on the table before each new instruction. To further improve coding accuracy, we hung a blue cloth on the wall opposite the video camera so that the child's hand would be easy to see (Figure 2 ). Once all the warm-up instructions had been carried out, E1 announced that the toys looked the same as in the photo. She showed the child the photo to see whether the child agreed and remarked on what a great job the child had done. E1 let the child chose a sticker as a reward and asked whether he or she would like to play another game. E1 then left the room on the pretext of needing to get another photo of a toy arrangement. She returned after a minute and suggested that she and the child arrange toys to match the arrangement in the new photo. At this point, E2 entered the room and explained that the secretary needed E1 to come to help her for a minute. E1 protested that she just needed to play a game quickly and asked if she could come in a minute. What happened next varied according to the two experimental conditions.
In the original partner condition, E2 acquiesced and said she would explain to the secretary that E1 would come in a minute. E1 then played the second game of that condition with the child. In the new partner condition, E2 told E1 that the secretary really needed her help now. E1 agreed to go, asking E2 if she could play the game with the child. E2 said she was not sure what to do, but E1 reassured her that it was easy and said, "You just need to make this look the same as in my picture, so you need to move the toys around. Like you might say 'Get the [filler item] and put it next to the [filler item].' [Child's name] will help you. We always put our hands on the red hands before we start to show we are ready. I'll be back in a minute." E1 left the room, and E2 played the second game with the child, remarking that it did not look too difficult and that these toys must be new as she had not seen them before.
The second game consisted of seven scripted instructions and was played in the same manner as the first, with the child's hands always on the red hand markers before the next instruction was given. Instructions 1, 2, and 7 referred to filler toys. For Instruction 3, E2 referred to a critical toy using the same term as had been previously used in the warm-up game. For Instruction 4, E2 referred to a critical toy using a new term, not heard during the warm-up. The difference in reaction times to Instructions 3 and 4 will be referred to as Trial 1. Likewise, for Instruction 5, E2 referred to a critical toy using the same term as in the warm-up game, and for Instruction 6, E2 referred to a critical toy using a new term. The difference in reaction times to Instructions 5 and 6 will be referred to as Trial 2. Note, we always had the baseline same-term measure before the new term one. In this way, we were able to take a measure of processing before anything unusual happened and compare this measure to the case in which a pact was broken. Doing the reverse may have caused spillover effects, where difficulties in processing the new term would slow down processing in the subsequent baseline trial. We will consider whether this may have happened in Trial 2 in the Discussion.
Once the experimenter had produced the referring expression, she remained looking at her photograph so as not to indicate the location of the target object with her gaze. When piloting the experiment, we found that if the experimenter remained looking at her picture for much longer than 10 s, she gave the impression of being disengaged from the task and thus uncooperative. Since cooperation was so central to the task, such a possibility would have been undesirable. We therefore set 10 s as the cutoff for a trial. If a child looked up at the experimenter, asked for help, or simply could not find the object in this time, no feedback was given. After 10 s, the experimenter pointed to the object, and the child's reaction time for that trial was recorded as 10 s. This happened on 34 occasions (out of a total 1,008 trials), all but one of which occurred when a different expression was used (23 of the cases were in the original partner condition).
Half the children took part in the original partner condition followed by the new partner condition. The other half had the opposite order. In whichever condition came first, Toy Set 1 was always used, and in the second condition, Toy Set 2 was always used. Scripts were fully counterbalanced so that for each pair of referring expressions, both terms were heard equally often as (a) the same term used twice (e.g., warm-up game: tree; test game: tree), (b) the original term before a switch (e.g. warm-up game: tree; test game: bush), and (c) the new term after a switch (e.g. warm-up game: bush; test game: tree).
All the scripts were written so that the critical toys would be located on the middle row before the test game began. This arrangement ensured the children would have to move their arm the same distance to reach each toy. Furthermore, the scripts and accompanying photographs were counterbalanced so that the critical toys appeared on the shelf in two different orders from left to right. This arrangement ensured that if any of the boxes was in a privileged position on the shelf (e.g., if it was easier to reach to the right), it would not affect the reaction times for a given condition. An example of the full script is provided in the Appendix A. Finally, the identities of E1 and E2 were counterbalanced. The same full-time female research assistant performed the role of E1 for half the children in each age group and E2 for the other half. The other experimenter role was performed by one of three other female experimenters.
Coding
The videos of the children's hand movements when retrieving toys were coded using Adobe Premier (Adobe Systems, San Jose, CA) software. A research assistant coded reaction times as the length of time it took from the onset of the critical referring expression (as located on the audio wave) for the child to reach into the relevant box (the first frame in which the fingertips were inside the box; see Figure 2 ). On four occasions, a 3-year-old retrieved an object that was not the target. These cases were excluded from analysis. Trials were also excluded if the child spoke during the experimenter's instruction or if the child decided to talk about or do something else before picking up the target object. The data for 12 randomly selected children were coded by a second assistant. The resulting reaction times were very highly correlated, indicating very good agreement (r ϭ .996, p Ͻ .001).
Results
Children of both ages generally found the task easy, although many were slowed down by-and even protested at-the use of new terms. To assess whether such delays showed partner-specific effects, we first analyzed children's reaction times when they were picking up target items. We then considered children's verbal protests at the use of new terms. Table 2 reports the mean reaction times for both ages and trials as a function of partner identity and referential term. Since the reaction times were not normally distributed, they could not be analyzed straightforwardly with standard parametric analyses. We therefore converted raw reaction times to difference scores for each trial by subtracting the reaction time for the item referred to with the original term from the reaction time for the item referred to with the new term. This substantially improved the distribution of the data. If children find it particularly hard to process new terms when they are produced by someone with whom they have previously made a pact (with the original partner), then difference scores should be significantly greater in the original partner condition. Figure 3 charts the mean differences in RTs for each age group, trial, and condition.
Reaction Times
To assess whether difference scores varied as a function of partner, we fitted a mixed effects regression model to the data with child and new term as random variables; trial, age, partner, and the interactions between these three factors as fixed effects; and difference in reaction times as the outcome variable (Baayen, 2008) . The results of this model are reported in Table 3 . There was a significant Trial ϫ Partner interaction. We therefore performed simpler models on Trial 1 and Trial 2 separately. There were no significant or borderline effects for Trial 2. The model for Trial 1 is reported in Table 4 . There was a significant effect of partner, such that difference scores were greater in the original partner condition. There was also a significant effect of age such that difference scores were greater for the younger children. The interaction between age and partner was not significant. Inspection of Figure 3 suggests that, unlike adults, the children were significantly slower to respond to new terms than to old, even when interacting with a new partner. Single sample t tests confirmed that the difference scores in the new partner condition were significantly above zero in all cases: 3-year-olds' Trial 1: t(57) ϭ 4.546, p Ͻ .001; 3-year-olds' Trial 2: t(52) ϭ 3.0566, p ϭ .004; 5-year-olds' Trial 1: t(63) ϭ 3.7249, p Ͻ .001; 5-year-olds' Trial 2: t(62) ϭ 2.8757, p ϭ .006.
Item Effects
An inspection of reaction times to each individual word revealed that some words were more problematic for children than other words. For example, switches between the terms apple and nose were particularly troubling, most probably because this item required the greatest shift in perspective. This was the case despite the fact that pretests had established that either term could be applied to the relevant object in the absence of a pact (see Method). Indeed, children did not struggle to identify any of the items when experimenters referred to them using either term in the warm up. We controlled for the use of the new term in each trial as a random effect in the previously described mixed effect model. Further- 
Duration of Expressions
As discussed by Metzing and Brennan (2003) , one concern with the current experimental paradigm is that differing reactions to new expressions produced by the different experimenters might be due to the differing acoustic properties of the two speakers' new and old expressions (as opposed to any sensitivity on the child's part to the speaker's identity). The idea here is that people generally tend to reduce referring expressions (i.e., articulate them faster) once they have produced them a few times in a given conversation. So, we might expect that in the original partner condition, E1 would reduce original but not new terms. Such a difference in speed of articulation would not be expected in the new partner condition, in which E2 produces all referring expressions for the first time. To investigate this possibility, we measured the length of each critical referring expression in the current study for duration in milliseconds. We then calculated the mean duration of each of the 16 words for each type of term (new, original) and each partner condition (new, original). The grand means for this analysis are reported in Table 5. A 2 (speaker) ϫ 2 term (term) ϫ 2 (trial) ϫ 2(age) analysis of variance (ANOVA) conducted on the mean duration of each of the 16 words revealed a significant main effect of speaker only, F(1, 15) ϭ 7.696, p ϭ .01, p 2 ϭ .339. There were no other main effects or interactions. A smaller analysis of only the 3-year-olds' data from Trial 1 with a 2 (speaker) ϫ 2 (term) ANOVA revealed a borderline effect of speaker only, F(1, 15) ϭ 4.028, p ϭ .06, p 2 ϭ .212. These results reflect the fact that E1 generally produced all terms slightly faster than E2, but each speaker produced new and original expressions equally quickly. It was therefore not the difference in time of articulation of new as opposed to original expressions that was driving the difference scores in our current experiment. It is possible that the fact the new expressions were produced slightly faster by E1 than E2 made E1's expressions harder for children to understand. However, all the expressions Note. Model log likelihood ϭ Ϫ1000. SD of random effects ϭ 1.22 or lower. HPD ϭ highest probability density interval. Note. Model log likelihood ϭ Ϫ516.5. SD of random effects ϭ 1.38 or lower. HPD ϭ highest probability density interval. were clearly articulated, and we think it unlikely that this small difference in time of articulation was driving children's quite substantial difficulties in understanding new as opposed to old terms. Rather, as the observations discussed in the following sections would indicate, we expect that the delay was due to the fact that children expected a different word to be employed.
Other Responses: Rejections and Corrections of the New Term
Most of the time children were able to pick up the target toy, albeit with a slight delay. However, occasionally children would have difficulty making sense of a new term, and either would refuse the term altogether or ask for help. Chi-square tests showed that such responses did not follow a statistically reliable pattern but are presented here for descriptive value. When refusing a term, children would respond by saying, for example, "I don't think there's any turtle," or "There is no nose." This happened on 14 occasions out of a total 504 new term trials: with the 3-year-olds, it occurred six times with the original partner and two times with the new partner, and with the 5-year-olds, it occurred four times with the original partner and two times with new partner. Alternatively some children would ask for help, saying for example, "Where's the lady?" or " You help me. " This happened on 27 occasions: with the 3-year-olds, it occurred 15 times with original partner and five times with new partner, and with 5-year-olds, it occurred three times with original partner and four times with the new partner. In cases of rejection or requests for help, the experimenter would delay (by looking at her script) until 10 s after her referring expression and then help the child if he or she had not located the toy in the meantime (many children guessed at the target before the experimenter needed to intervene; see Method).
Despite the fact that the children easily responded to the vast majority of new terms, 31% of children indicated on at least one occasion that they were not happy with the use of the new term. They would thus pick up the toy and then protest, saying, for example, "It's not a tree; it's a bush!" These protests were roughly as common in the original partner condition as in the new partner condition, although arguably they may have been made for different reasons (correcting E1 vs. informing E2) in the different contexts. In the original partner condition, 16% of the 3-year-olds and 16% of the 5-year-olds protested at least once (making a total of 24 protests). In the new partner condition, 24% of the 3-yearolds and 23% of the 5-year-olds protested at least once (total of 36 protests). It is worth noting that children always preferred that the original term be maintained. Given the pretest, the fact that in the warm up, children always chose the right object (regardless of which term was used and despite the counterbalanced design) suggests that children's protests were not based on their general preference for one term over another but rather were based on a preference created with E1 during the warm-up trial. Three 5-yearolds indicated that they explicitly appreciated the term had been introduced by E1 by saying, "She said it was a nose/pony" or "That's a nose, you said." None of the 3-year-olds demonstrated an equivalent understanding of the origin of their preference (this finding is consistent with that of, e.g., O'Neill & Gopnik, 1991).
Discussion
The results of the reaction time analysis suggest that children show sensitivity to referential pacts from a young age. Like adults, children were particularly slow to pick up objects referred to with a new term when interacting with their original partner who had previously referred to the same object with a different expression. It is interesting that this effect was observed only for the first trial of each test phase. Additional relevant observations were that, unlike adults, all children slowed down to some extent even when a new term was used by a new partner. Second, children were slowed down to a far greater extent than adults (in Metzing and Brennan's 2003 study, adults recovered from broken pacts in approximately 700 ms; 3-year-olds took more than double that time). Finally, some children protested at the use of new terms but did so indiscriminately with respect to partner condition. How do these findings relate to our original questions?
The fact that even 3-year-olds show the hallmark pattern of reaction times, slowing down markedly when an original partner uses a new term, demonstrates that children this age show sensitivity to referential pacts, even though they have traditionally been thought incapable of managing conflicting perspectives on an object. One conclusion that we could draw from this finding is that these children have greater social-cognitive understanding than we anticipated and were drawing on this understanding to perform communicative inferences ("She doesn't know that we called this an x, so that's why she's calling it a y"). An alternative conclusion is sensitivity to referential pacts does not necessarily require inference making of this complexity. Let us consider the relative merits of these positions.
The first possible conclusion is that 3-year-olds have adultlike social-cognitive insight and readily engage in referential pacts as an agreement with their partner to take a given perspective on an object when this agreement is believed by both interlocutors to be mutual. Inferences based on this belief (and an understanding of other people's lack of it) led to the observed reaction time results. This account has the merit of explaining why children would protest at the use of new terms. It does not explain, however, why children protested roughly equally with new partners as with old. Three 5-year-olds indicated that their protest was based on what their original partner had said to them. There was no such indication that the 3-year-olds were aware of the reason for their preference for a term. Instead, they seemed just as indignant when a new term was used by a new partner as by an old partner who could have known better. Indeed, we asked a handful of protesting children at the end of the experiment why a new experimenter had used the term x, and they replied, "Because she got it wrong." We conclude that despite showing sensitivity to partner specific referential history in their reaction times, the younger children probably did not engage in a fully adultlike process of inference. Instead, they appeared "hyperconventional": while they understood that the alternative terms were intended to refer to the same object, they were very keen to pass normative judgment on term use and did not appear to fully appreciate that different people might take different perspectives on an object and choose different possible terms somewhat arbitrarily (see also Carpenter, 2009; Kalish, Weissman, & Bernstein, 2000; Rakoczy, Warneken, & Tomasello, 2008) . This is in line with the long-observed phenomenon of nominal realism, from which children are relatively slow to recover (Brook, 1970; Homer, Brockmeier, Kamawar, & Olson, 2001; Piaget, 1929) . The second possible conclusion is that children do not need to engage in drawing inferences based on E1's knowledge and E2's lack thereof in order to show sensitivity to referential pacts. Instead, they may rely on memory that is socially rich in the sense that it selectively encodes who had said what to them previously (cf. Liebal, Behne, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2009; Wyman, Rakoczy, & Tomasello, 2009b , for a demonstrations that infants and 3-year-olds are capable of this sort of encoding in nonlinguistic games). This memory would keep track of previous experiences with objects, the people with which the objects had been encountered, and the terms that had been used to refer to the objects (Horton, 2007; Horton & Gerrig, 2005) . Such a memory would lead to a strong expectation that E1 would use the same word that she had used before and a weaker expectation that E2 would use the same term that E1 had used before. The stronger the expectation, the more comprehension is slowed down when it is violated. Three-year-olds apparently take slightly longer to inhibit strong expectations than do 5-year-olds, who are in turn slightly slower to do so than adults. This is not surprising given that younger children most likely have more specific memories of previous encounters with referents (Herbert & Hayne, 2000) and less inhibitory control than their older peers and adults (Diamond, 2006; Klenberg, Korkman, & Lahti-Nuuttila, 2001) .
This account has the advantage of explaining why children are slowed down to some extent even when a new partner uses a new term. In many ways, this finding is not surprising. Normally speaking, people use the same words to refer to the same things, and children come to expect this of them (E. V. Clark, 2007; Henderson & Graham, 2005; Henderson, Woodward, Bonny, Smith, & Perez Rojas, 2009 ). Language as a system of culturally evolved conventions relies on this very fact. Furthermore, the speech that young children hear reinforces, arguably even creates, this expectation, and it is only as children grow older that opportunities to observe pragmatically motivated exceptions to this general pattern become more readily available (Callanan & Sabbagh, 2004; Callanan, Siegel, & Luce, 2007) . Having more experience with such exceptions, adults show only momentary confusion when a new partner produces a new term in a set-up similar to the current experiment (see Metzing & Brennan, 2003, p. 212 ). This confusion is picked up in adults' increased eye movements toward and away from the target but results in no detectable cost in terms of reaction times to pick up an object. In contrast, the children in the current study were slowed by about 500 ms when a new partner used a new term. It is possible that bilingual children, who are exposed to alternative means of referring to the same things early on, might be more adultlike for this very reason. Substantial evidence shows that exposure to more than one language does indeed shape pragmatic development (Au & Glusman, 1990; Byers-Heinlein & Werker, 2009; Cummins, 1978; Davidson & Tell, 2005; Diesendruck, 2005; Rosenblum & Pinker, 1983; Siegal, Iozzi, & Surian, 2009) . We thus expect that bilinguals may process referential pacts differently as a consequence of their linguistic experience.
In our preferred account, then, children's early sensitivity to referential pacts is based on a socially rich memory of recent interactions and a strong expectation that people will in general use the same term for the same objects. When a situation comes about that violates this expectation, children actively seek to establish what has gone wrong, sometimes explicitly protesting at the use of the new term. Plausibly, it is by engaging in such experiences in more natural contexts that children learn the reason that, in some circumstances, different people may refer to the same thing in different ways (in this case, because one person was unaware of how another person had spoken about an object and happened to take a different perspective on it). With time, inferences based on this understanding would speed recovery from children's general same-term-for-same-referent expectation.
One surprising finding in the current study was that children did not show a statistically significant partner-specific effect when a pact was broken in the second trial. There are two possible reasons. First, it could well have been sufficient for the original partner to have been unreliable once for children to no longer have such a strong expectation that they would maintain her precedent. This explanation is in line with recent studies of referential pacts in adults (Brown-Schmidt, 2009 ) and more broadly with other "oneshot" effects in the developmental literature (e.g., Pasquini, Corriveau, Koenig, & Harris, 2007) . Second, it is possible that a spillover effect occurred, in which difficulties in processing the new term on Trial 1 slowed down processing of both the old and new terms in Trial 2. This spillover effect could have dampened any partner-specific effects in Trial 2 to the extent that they were picked up merely as a trend in the second trial. In future studies, use of filler items between Trials 1 and 2 would help to avoid such an effect. It is worth noting that although the partner-specific effect diminished on Trial 2, children were still slowed down by the use of new terms relative to old in both partner conditions. This confirms the strength of children's general expectation that, all else being equal, the same terms will be used to refer to objects over time.
Having tentatively argued that young children do not process referential pacts by drawing complex inferences about others' experience of referential precedents, we believe that it is worth considering whether future studies that would strengthen or refute this position. Our argument rests in large part on the observation that protests were roughly equally frequent in the original partner and new partner conditions. However, only about a quarter of the children protested at the use of new terms with a new partner. The remaining three quarters of the children did not protest at all in this condition, and so perhaps they were engaging in adultlike inferential processes during the recovery process. Furthermore, it could be that protests are not straightforward reflections of children's language comprehension, for reasons we will discuss later. Consequently, it will be essential to assess whether we are underestimating the flexibility of children's pragmatic reasoning and their insight into linguistic convention. This might be achieved, for example, by assessing whether referential pacts are defeasible in children (i.e., whether they are open to cancellation or revision if countervailing evidence arises; see Grodner & Sedivy, in press , for defeasibility in adults).
Also interesting would be further investigation of the basis of the protests we observed and whether they can be assumed to be objections about the breaking of a referential pact per se. Children clearly were protesting at some break with the conventions they thought held in the game they were playing. The question is whether these conventions were concerned with the use of words (referential pacts) or the classification of objects. A convention regarding word use might take the following form: in the context of talking about these toys, word x stands for object y. A convention regarding object classification would be that in the context of this game, toy x is an instance of class y. Anyone who breaks this convention would have misunderstood the assumed identity of one of the toys: "You called this a tortoise, but it really is a turtle." This latter kind of protest is akin to those observed in pretend play (Wyman, Rakoczy, & Tomasello, 2009a) . Children would be able to make such objections quite distinctly from memory-based processing of referential precedents. Of course, the fact remains that anyone with a solid understanding of common ground would not expect E2 to adhere to either type of convention, and so it is that we assume children in the current study still have some developmental ground to cover (see Carpenter, 2009 , for related evidence of overattribution of shared goals in 3-year-olds). Nonetheless, future studies might tease apart the distinction between "referential" and "identity" conventions by having more complex linguistic stimuli that allow people to talk about the same object in different ways without changing the object's basic character quite so dramatically (e.g., adjective noun combinations allow for descriptions like shiny cylinder and silver tube). Alternatively, stimuli could be chosen to highlight the ambiguous nature of objects, thereby rendering the validity of alternative perspectives on them more salient (e.g., by having dual-identity toys like a sponge in the shape of a rock or changed-identity objects like a zebra whose stripes are rubbed off between trials). Either way, it would be valuable to explore whether children-in addition to demonstrating what we think are memory-based effects-are capable of explicitly protesting about linguistic conventions when "identity conventions" are not at stake.
To conclude, we suggest that children are able to process pacts by drawing on (a) an expectation that the same term will be used for the same referent when it is encountered in the same contexts and (b) memory for recent referential histories of specific interlocutors in specific contexts. Children differ from adults in having more specific memories of previous encounters with referents, more entrenched expectations that the same term will be used for the same referent, less inhibitory control when referential expectations are not met, little insight into the arbitrariness of linguistic conventions, and only nascent skill in rapidly drawing complex explanatory inferences based on others' (lack) of linguistic experience. As children approach adulthood, we assume they will overcome these developmental hurdles and be able to make explicit inferences concerning why referential terms may sometimes vary as a function of speaker. The current study does not, therefore, refute the possibility that adults are able to process information relevant to their interlocutor's needs very rapidly (Brennan & Hanna, 2009; Brown-Schmidt, 2009 ). However, it does lend weight to accounts in the adult psycholinguistic literature that propose that such processing relies on partner-specific memory of prior conversations (Horton & Gerrig, 2005; Metzing & Brennan, 2003; Shintel & Keysar, 2007) . It also supports the idea that the effect of referential pacts has multiple bases, including a strong general expectation that people will use the same term to refer to the same thing (Kronmüller & Barr, 2007) . The point here is that if children are able to process referential pacts without recourse to drawing complex audience-designed inferences, then it becomes plausible that adults will readily be able to do so. Which processes adults rely on at any given time presumably depends on factors such as recent experience, cognitive load (Kronmüller & Barr, 2007) , and motivation (Brown-Schmidt, 2009 ). This account sits well with theoretical proposals that the processes underlying communication, and indeed social cognition more generally, vary as a function of the task at hand (Apperly & Butterfill, 2009; Bard & Aylett, 2005 
